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Abstract— In this paper, we investigate informational asym-
metries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model
of competitive resource allocation between two players over
a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to
randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with
certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield
realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources
to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a
two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then
focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a
popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the
unique equilibrium payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies.
We quantify the value of information - the difference in
equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game
and complete information game. We find information strictly
improves the informed player’s performance guarantee. How-
ever, the magnitude of improvement varies with the informed
player’s strength as well as the game parameters. Our analysis
highlights the interplay between strength and information in
adversarial environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
In adversarial interactions, informational asymmetries may
provide an advantage to one competitor over the other.
Adversarial contests appear in a wide range of applications,
such as political campaigns [1], [2], security of cyber-
physical systems [3], and competitive advertising [4]. Rigor-
ous studies on the interplay between asymmetric information
and strategic decision-making in adversarial settings has
received attention in the recent literature [5], [6]. Though
these works analyze general zero-sum game settings, another
popular framework for analyzing such contests is the Colonel
Blotto game. Two players strategically allocate their limited
resources over a finite set of battlefields. A player secures
a battlefield if it has allocated more resources to it than the
opponent. Each player aims to secure as many battlefields
as possible. The goal of the present paper is to quantify the
performance improvements one player in the Blotto game
may experience when it possesses system-level information
while its opponent does not.
Though simply posed, the Colonel Blotto game features
highly complex strategies. The established literature on the
Colonel Blotto game and its variants primarily focuses on
characterizing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, due to non-
existence of pure equilibria in most cases of interest. First
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introduced by Borel in 1921 [7], researchers have incre-
mentally contributed to this body of work over the last
one hundred years [8], [9]. In 1950, Gross and Wagner
[8] provided an equilibrium solution of the two battlefield
case with asymmetric values and resources, as well as for n
homogeneous battlefields and symmetric resources. In 2006,
the work of Roberson [9] generalized the solution to n
battlefields and asymmetric forces by leveraging the solutions
of all-pay auctions and the theory of copulas [10].
There recently has been renewed interest in the Colonel
Blotto game, along with its many variants and extensions
[2], [11]–[15]. Notably, results for heterogeneous battlefield
valuations have appeared in Colonel Blotto as well as the
General Lotto variant, which admits a more tractable analysis
[13], [14]. Blotto games have also received attention in
engineering application areas such as the security of cyber-
physical systems [3] and the formation of large-scale net-
works [16], [17]. The vast majority of these studies assume
the players have complete information about the opposing
player’s resource budget and the values of each battlefield.
Few works have considered the Blotto or Lotto game with
incomplete information. In [18], the authors study a Blotto
game in which players have incomplete information about
the other’s resource budgets. In [19], the players are subject
to incomplete information about the battlefield valuations. In
both of these works, all players are equally uninformed about
the parameters, and hence symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria
are provided. To the best of our knowledge, one-shot Blotto
games where the players possess asymmetric information has
not received attention in the literature.
In this paper, we formulate a Bayesian game framework
in which one player is completely informed and the other
does not receive any side information about the battlefield
valuations (Section III). Our main contributions characterize
unique equilibrium payoffs and strategies in representative
scenarios of this framework. We first analyze the Colonel
Blotto game with two battlefields (Section IV). With three
battlefields, we are able to solve for unique mixed-strategy
equilibria in a representative General Lotto game under
the same informational asymmetry (Section V). We do this
by leveraging established results on all-pay auctions with
asymmetric information [20] (Section VI). We can then
quantify the difference between the equilibrium payoff in this
game and the scenario where both players are uninformed.
These characterizations allow us to determine conditions
under which the informed player has an advantage in the
Lotto game, despite having fewer resources to allocate.
As an illustrative analysis, we consider a scenario where
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both players are uninformed and the option of purchasing
information with a fraction of its budget is available only to
the weaker player. We quantify a measure of informational
value determined by the largest proportion of resources the
player is willing to give up in exchange for information
(Section V).
II. MODEL
Two players, I and U , allocate their non-atomic forces
across n battlefields simultaneously. In each battlefield j ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the player that sends more forces wins the
battlefield and receives payoff vj , while the losing player
receives −vj . In the case of a tie on a battlefield, both players
receive zero payoff. The utility to each player is the sum
of payoffs across all battlefields. The players have a budget
on their forces, XI , XU > 0. We assume XI < XU . The
budgets and battlefield valuations v := {vj}nj=1 are common
knowledge. For z ∈ {I, U}, a pure strategy is a non-negative
vector xz = (x1z, . . . , x
n
z ) ∈ Rn+. We call xz an allocation.
The payoff to player z is
uz(xz,x−z;v) :=
n∑
j=1
vjsgn(xjz − xj−z), (1)
where we follow the convention sgn(0) = 0. This defines a
zero-sum game since the payoff to player −z is the negative
of the above. A mixed strategy for player z is an n-variate
distribution function Fz on Rn+. That is, an allocation xz
is drawn from the distribution Fz . A distribution Fz has
n univariate marginal (cumulative) distributions {F jz }nj=1,
specifying the allocation distributions to each battlefield.
Extending the definition of (1) to mixed strategies, the
expected payoff for each player can be expressed as
uz(Fz, F−z;v) =
∫
Rn+
∫
Rn+
n∑
j=1
vjsgn(xjz − xj−z)dFzdF−z
=
n∑
j=1
vj
∫ ∞
0
(2F j−z − 1)dF jz .
(2)
A. The Colonel Blotto game
In the Colonel Blotto game, a feasible allocation xz for
player z ∈ {I, U} lies in the set
B(Xz) :=
{
xz ∈ Rn+ :
n∑
j=1
xjz = Xz
}
. (BC)
Furthermore, the support of a mixed strategy Fz is contained
in B(Xz). Thus, an allocation xz drawn from Fz belongs
to B(Xz) with probability one. We denote the set of all
such feasible mixed strategies with B(Xz). We refer to the
Colonel Blotto game with CB(XI , XU ,v).
B. The General Lotto game
The General Lotto game relaxes the support constraint in
the Colonel Blotto game, requiring each player’s allocation
budget to be met only in expectation with respect to their
marginal distributions. That is,
L(Xz) :=
{
Fz :
n∑
j=1
EF jz [x
j
z] = Xz
}
(LC)
is the set of such feasible mixed strategies. Note that both the
budget constraint (LC) and expected payoff (2) only depend
on the univariate marginal distributions and not the joint n-
variate distribution Fz . Hence, a player’s choice amounts
to selecting n independent univariate marginals that satisfy
(LC). We specify General Lotto game with GL(XI , XU ,v).
III. BLOTTO AND LOTTO GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
Using a standard Bayesian games framework, we wish
to model a situation in which the battlefield valuations
are subject to randomness. Suppose there are m possible
sets of battlefield valuations, labeled by the states Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωm}. The state ωi is realized with probability
pi > 0, and the probability vector p ∈ ∆(Ω) satisfying∑m
i=1 pi = 1 is common knowledge to the players. Given
state ωi is realized, battlefield j is worth v
j
i > 0, and we
denote V as the m× n matrix with elements vji .
We consider the setting where player I observes the true
state realization, and player U does not receive any side
information about the realization1. We call U the “unin-
formed” player. Specifically, player I has m distinct types
TI := {t1, . . . , tm}, receiving type ti whenever state ωi is
realized. That is, I knows the realization with certainty. We
refer to TI as its type space. Player U has a single type, and
hence infers the realization (and I’s type) according to the
common prior p. The information structure is known to both
players.
A strategy for player I consists of n-variate distributions
{FI(ti)}mi=1, one for each type ti, i = 1, . . . ,m. We refer
to the collection FI = {FI(ti)}mi=1 as I’s strategy. Player
U ’s strategy FU is a single n-variate distribution. For the
Lotto game, FI(ti) ∈ L(XI) for each t1, . . . , tm, and
FU ∈ L(XU ). For the Blotto game, they belong to B(XI)
and B(XU ), respectively. We denote {F jI (tI)}nj=1 as the
univariate marginals of FI(tI) for each tI ∈ TI , and F jU the
univariate marginals of FU . All of these components specify
a Lotto or Blotto game with incomplete information, which
we denote as GL(XI , XU , V,p) and CB(XI , XU , V,p), re-
spectively. The expected utility of player U is
piU (FU , FI) :=
m∑
i=1
piuU (FU , FI(ti), ωi) (3)
where with some abuse of notation, we use ωi to refer to the
battlefield valuation set in state i. The ex-interim utility for
player I , given type ti is the expected payoff
piI(FI(ti), FU |ti) := uI(FI(ti), FU , ωi). (4)
1A more general framework of asymmetric information may be formu-
lated with Bayesian games. That is, arbitrary partial information structures
may be assigned to the players. Since our focus is on one informed and one
uninformed player, we leave such generalizations to future work.
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Fig. 1: (a) A diagram of the Colonel Blotto game with two battlefields and asymmetric budgets and information. There are two possible
battlefield valuation sets, each realized with probability 1
2
. Player I has fewer resources than player U, but knows the true realization. (b)
The equilibrium payoff (8) to the informed player in the Blotto game CB(XI , XU , V, 12 ), where v¯ = 1 and v = α ∈ (0, 1). It is negative
when γ ∈ ( 1
2
, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). (c) The value of information, pi∗I − piGWI , is non-negative. Information offers the most improvement for
low budget (γ near 1
2
) and when there is higher priority in the diagonal battlefields (α low).
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile
(F ∗I , F
∗
U ) satisfying
F ∗I (ti) ∈ arg max
FI(ti)
piI(FI(ti), F
∗
U |ti),∀i = 1, . . . ,m
and F ∗U ∈ arg max
FU
piU (FU , F
∗
I ).
(5)
An equivalent BNE condition is that (F ∗I , F
∗
U ) satisfies the
best-response correspondences in ex-ante payoffs, given that
each pi > 0 [21]. That is, F ∗U ∈ arg max
FU
piU (FU , F
∗
I ) and
F ∗I ∈ arg max
{FI(ti)}mi=1
piI(FI , F
∗
U ), where I’s ex-ante payoff is
piI(FI , FU ) :=
m∑
i=1
pipiI(FI(ti), FU |ti). (6)
We note that since the underlying complete information game
is zero-sum, the games with asymmetric information are
also zero-sum with respect to ex-ante utilities (3), (6). This
allows us to speak of a unique equilibrium ex-ante payoff
pi∗I = −pi∗U of the Blotto and Lotto games with asymmetric
information.
IV. COLONEL BLOTTO RESULTS
In the following structural result, we characterize sufficient
conditions on the budget ratio γ := XIXU such that the
stronger player U is guaranteed a positive equilibrium payoff
regardless of the information asymmetry.
Proposition 1. Assume XIXU < 1. Consider the game
CB(XI , XU , V,p) where V ∈ m × n, i.e. there are n
battlefields and m possible state realizations. A sufficient
condition for which pi∗U ≥ 0 is{
XI
XU
< 2n , if n is even
XI
XU
< 2n+1 , if n is odd
(7)
Proof. Denote Ej =
∑m
i=1 piv
j
i as the prior expected value
of battlefield j. Without loss of generality, assume the n
battlefields are ordered according to E1 ≥ E2 ≥ · · · ≥ En.
For n even, consider player U’s deterministic strategy that
places 2XI/n to the first n/2 battlefields, and the remaining
resources allocated arbitrarily. This guarantees U attains at
least half of the total available value. That is, U’s security
value for this strategy is at least zero. Similar reasoning
applies to the case of n odd. 
For two battlefields, the weaker resource player I never
wins the game, despite having better information. The
following analysis focuses on the two battlefield case of
CB(XI , XU , V,p) under the uniform prior p = 1212. Al-
though I never wins, we quantify how information improves
its payoff relative to when both players are uninformed. A
solution for a general prior p = [p, 1−p] remains a challenge
in this analysis, due to the complexity of finding suitable
equilibrium distributions. Hence for the rest of this section,
we assume p = 12 .
A. Two battlefields case
If XIXU <
1
2 , player U can secure both battlefields re-
gardless of what I does. We thus restrict our attention to
the regime XIXU ∈ ( 12 , 1). We state the main result of this
section, which characterizes the equilibrium payoff to I .
Here, we assume a symmetric structure on the battlefields
V = 1v¯+v
[
v¯ v
v v¯
]
for v¯ > v > 0. Figure 1a illustrates the
setup of this game.
Theorem 1. Let XIXU ∈ ( 12 , 1), and assume p = 12 . Define
q = b XUXU−XI c. Then the ex-ante equilibrium payoff to the
informed player I is
pi∗I =
−
(
2
∑ q−1
2
k=0 (v¯/v)
k − 1
)−1
if q odd
− vv¯+v
(∑ q
2−1
k=0 (v¯/v)
k
)−1
if q even
(8)
We provide the proof in the Appendix, which details a
set of equilibrium mixed strategies. When both players are
uninformed, i.e. both have a single type, we have a complete
information game where the two battlefield valuations are
their expected values, 12 . The equilibrium payoff is then
given by an application of Gross and Wagner’s solution [8],
which yields piGWI := − 1q . The following result verifies the
equilibrium payoff improves when I obtains information.
Corollary 1. We have pi∗I > pi
GW
I . That is, information strictly
improves the equilibrium payoff for I .
Proof. Consider the q even case. Since vv¯+v <
1
2 and
v¯
v > 1
for v¯ > v, from (8) we get − vv¯+v
(∑ q
2−1
k=0 (v¯/v)
k
)−1
> − 1q .
Similar arguments apply in the q odd case. 
We may quantify a value of information in this setting
as the payoff difference pi∗I − piGWI . Setting v¯ = 1 and v =
α ∈ (0, 1), we plot the equilibrium values pi∗I in Figure 1 , as
well as the value of information. In the two battlefield Blotto
game, an informed player still cannot gain an advantage, as
pi∗I < 0 for all parameters (α, γ) ∈ (0, 1)×(0, 1). Information
offers the most payoff improvement when I’s budget is low
and the minor battlefield α is worth less (Fig. 1c).
In the next section, we consider the three battlefield case in
the General Lotto game. In general, equilibrium solutions for
n ≥ 3 heterogeneous battlefields have not been characterized
in the Colonel Blotto game, due to the complexity of finding
suitable copulas for the marginal distributions [2]. The Lotto
constraint relaxation allows for analytic tractability in cases
of more than two heterogeneous battlefields [14].
V. RESULTS ON GENERAL LOTTO
We restrict our attention to a representative three-
battlefield Lotto game GL(XI , XU , Vαβ ,p), where p =
( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ), and Vαβ =
1
1+α+β
1 α ββ 1 α
α β 1
. where 1 > α ≥
β > 0. In each set of battlefields (rows), the total valuation
is normalized to one. Though this formulation may be quite
specific, the representative game serves as an illustrative and
tractable scenario highlighting the informational asymmetry
between players. Intuitively, for small α, β values, the valu-
able battlefield is worth 1 but sits at a different location
in each realization. An informed player would be able to
take the most advantage by focusing its resources on this
battlefield without wasting resources on the other battlefields.
A. Main result: characterization of equilibrium payoff
Theorem 2. Let γ = XIXU ≤ 1. Then player I’s equilibrium
payoff, pi∗I (α, β, γ), for α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) takes the values
3γ
1+α+β − 1, if γ ∈ (0, 13 ]
1
1+α+β
[(
1− 13γ
)
(3γα+ (1−α)) + 1
]
−1, if γ ∈ ( 13 , 23 ]
(9)
and
1
1+α+β
[
2− 13γ + α
(
2− 1γ
)
+ 3βγ
(
1− 23γ
)]
−1 (10)
if γ ∈ ( 23 , 1].
A plot of pi∗I is shown in Figure 2a for the special case α =
β. We provide the details of the proof in Section VI, where
we draw upon known results in asymmetric information
all-pay auctions. An iterative algorithm is formulated in
[20] to construct mixed equilibrium strategies. To verify
that the set of constructed strategies indeed is a BNE of
GL(XI , XU , Vαβ , 1313), the constraint (LC) must be met.
B. The value of information in the Lotto game
In the following analysis, we consider a scenario in which
both players are uninformed, and the option to purchase
information with a fraction of its budget is available to player
I . We quantify a value of information as the equilibrium
payoff gain or loss in purchasing information, and specify
the maximal cost I is willing to pay before it experiences a
payoff loss. In the case both players are uninformed, we may
use the algorithm of [20] to solve the Lotto game. In this
setting, we arrive at the equilibrium payoff γ − 1 for I . We
first highlight some immediate consequences of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. We have that pi∗I (α, β, γ) > γ−1 for (α, β, γ) ∈
(0, 1)3. That is, information strictly improves the equilibrium
payoff for I . Additionally, pi∗I is strictly decreasing in α and
β, and strictly increasing in γ.
Proof. The first claim follows from comparing the expres-
sions (9) and (10) to γ − 1. The second claim follows by
showing the respective signs of partial derivatives hold. 
We also characterize the parameter region in which an
informed I wins the game for the special case α = β.
Corollary 3. Fix a budget ratio γ. Then pi∗I (α, α, γ) > 0 if
and only if α <
1
3−γ
3γ2−4γ+ 13
.
Proof. Player I cannot win in the first region γ ∈ (0, 13 ],
as pi∗I ≤ 0. We find that the second expression of (9) is
equivalent to (10) when β = α. We then solve the equation
pi∗I (α, α, γ) = 0 for α, from which we obtain the result. 
We now provide a general quantity of describing the
value of information. In particular, we consider a scenario
where both players are uninformed. Player I , with the
budget ratio γ, has an opportunity to purchase information
with a fraction cI of its budget. The value of information
quantifies the equilibrium payoff gain or loss in purchasing
the information at the budget fraction cost cI . Formally, the
value of information is the quantity
VoI(α, γ) := pi∗I (α, α, (1− cI)γ)− (1− γ). (11)
An instance of the value of information is plotted in Figure
2b, when the cost is cI = 15 . We note there is a regime in
which information is not worth the cost, i.e. VoI(α, γ) < 0.
We also seek to find the highest cost on information that I
is willing to pay before it experiences an equilibrium payoff
loss. To quantify this cost, let γe be defined as the value that
satisfies pi∗I (α, α, γe) = γ − 1. Such a value is unique and
well-defined for any α, since pi∗I (α, α, γ) > γ − 1 and is
strictly increasing in γ, by Corollary 2. Then CI(α, γ) :=
γ−γe
γ is the largest fraction of resources I can give up. That
is, for all cI ∈ [0, CI(α, γ)], we have pi∗I (α, α, (1− cI)γ) ≥
γ − 1, with equality if and only if cI = CI(α, γ). Then,
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Fig. 2: (a) The equilibrium payoff pi∗I to the informed player in the Lotto game GL(XI , XU , Vαβ , 1313), under the special case α = β.
The dashed line are the points (γ, α) for which pi∗I = 0. That is, for parameters below the line, the informed player “wins” the game and
“loses” for parameters above the line (see Corollary 3). (b) The value of information, or payoff gain or loss to player I from purchasing
information at the cost cI = 15 . The dashed black line in Figure 2b indicates the parameters for which VoI(α, γ) = 0. (c) The maximal cost
(12), or the largest fraction of its resource budget γ that player I is willing to give up in exchange for information before it experiences
a payoff loss. Information is more valuable in lower α ranges - when the battlefield rewards are concentrated at diverse locations.
Corollary 4. Fix a budget ratio γ. Then
CI(α, γ) =
{
1
γ (γ − γe(α, γ)) if (α, γ) ∈ B
1− 13cα if (α, γ) /∈ B
(12)
where γe(α, γ) :=
−(2(1−α)cα−γ)+
√
(2(1−α)cα−γ)2+4c2αα(1−α)
6αcα
,
cα :=
1
1+2α , and B := {(α, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2 : γe(α, γ) ≥ 13}.
Proof. We solve the equation pi∗I (α, α, γe) = γ − 1 for γe.
Recall the second expression of (9) is equivalent to (10) when
β = α. The resulting value is valid only if γe > 13 . If not,
we solve for γe using the first entry of (9). 
Figure 2c plots CI(α, γ). As an example, when γ = 1
and α = 0, player I can exchange up to 23 of its budget for
information and still obtain a payoff greater than γ− 1 = 0.
When α is high, player I cannot afford to give up resources,
as information is less valuable in this regime.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We show that the equilibria in the Lotto game
GL(XI , XU , V,p) coincides with equilibria of n independent
all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and valuations.
The work of Siegel [20] provides an iterative algorithm for
which to construct equilibrium mixed strategies in the all-pay
auction. We leverage this procedure to construct proposed
equilibrium distributions in the Lotto game, and verify that
they satisfy the constraint (LC).
A. Two-player all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
and valuations
Here, we specialize the setup of [20] to our setting of an
informed player I and an uninformed player U . Assume the
two players compete in an all-pay auction over an indivisible
good, where the players I and U have the same type spaces
as before. When type ti ∈ TI is realized (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})
with probability pi > 0, player I’s valuation of the good is
νI(ti) and player U ’s valuation is νU (ti). Assume the types
in TI are ordered such that
νI(ti) ≥ νI(tk) (13)
whenever i < k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In the two player all-pay
auction with asymmetric information and valuations, player
I selects the distributions of bids FI : TI × R+ → [0, 1]
contingent on its type. We write FI(ti) to refer to the
distribution of bids in type i, FI(ti, x) to refer to its value
at x ≥ 0, and fI to refer to its density function. As player
U has a single type, it selects a single distribution of bids,
FU : R+ → [0, 1]. The best-response problems for each
player are
max
FI(ti)
i=1,...,m
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
[νI(ti)FU − x] dFI(ti)
max
FU
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
[νU (ti)FI(ti)− x] dFU .
(14)
B. Algorithm of [20]
An iterative procedure is formulated in [20] to construct
equilibrium mixed strategies satisfying the correspondences
(14). We note that this procedure handles general player
information structures in the two-player all-pay auction. In
this paper, we restrict our attention to its application in our
informed-uninformed setting. In particular, the constructed
marginals are proven to be piecewise constant functions
with finite support, with the possibility of having point
masses placed at zero. We do not give further details of this
algorithm due to space limitations and for ease of exposition.
We refer the reader to [20] for a general proof that the output
distributions satisfy (14).
C. Connection of General Lotto to all-pay auctions
In the game GL(XI , XU , V,p), player U ’s Lagrangian at
both ex-ante and interim levels may be written as
n∑
j=1
max
F jU
[
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
(
2vji
λU
F jI (ti)− x
)
dF jU
]
(15)
where λU > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on U’s expected
budget constraint (LC), and we have removed constant
additive and multiplicative terms in the expression that do
not depend on the decision variables {F jU}nj=1. In a similar
fashion, player I’s Lagrangian maximization at the interim
level may be written
max
F jI (ti)
j=1,...,n
λiI
n∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
(
2vji
λiI
F jU − x
)
dF jI (ti) (16)
where the multiplier λiI > 0 corresponds to the budget
constraint (LC) in type ti. When two sets of battlefields
contain the same valuations, we can deduce equivalence
between the corresponding Lagrange multipliers.
Lemma 1. Consider the game GL(XI , XU , V,p). Suppose
the rows i and k of V have the same elements, each
with identical multiplicities. Then the equilibrium ex-interim
payoff to player I for type ti is equivalent to that of type tk.
Furthermore, λiI = λ
k
I .
Proof. An equivalent formulation of (16) in type i is
max
FI(ti)∈L(XI)
piI(FI , FU |ti) (17)
The corresponding problem for type tk is identical to the
above, because the valuations in both rows are the same
(possibly with some permutation of indices j), and the
optimization for player U remains (15). This shows the
equivalence of interim equilibrium payoffs.
To show λiI = λ
k
I , let F
∗
I solve (17) for both types ti and
tk. Any allocation xIj ∈ R+ to battlefield j in the support of
F j∗I solves the one-dimensional problem maxx
2vji
λiI
F j∗U −x as
well as maxx
2vji
λkI
F j∗U −x. Therefore, the first-order necessary
condition for optimality that holds is λiI = 2v
j
i f
j∗
U (x
I
j ) = λ
k
I .

To solve for a BNE, we write the best-response corre-
spondences at the ex-ante level. Player U’s ex-ante best-
response problem is given by (15), while Player I’s ex-ante
optimization problem may be written
n∑
j=1
max
F jI (ti)
i=1,...,m
[
m∑
i=1
λiI
∫ ∞
0
(
2vji pi
λiI
F jU − x
)
dF jI (ti)
]
(18)
after removing additive constants. Under the conditions λiI =
λI > 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m (by Lemma 1), each battlefield
j is an independent all-pay auction, whose problem is
max
F jU
[
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
(
2vji
λU
F jI (ti)− x
)
dF jU
]
(19)
max
F jI (ti)
i=1,...,m
[
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
(
2vji pi
λI
F jU − x
)
dF jI (ti)
]
(20)
which coincides with (14) with auction valuations νU (ti) =
2vji
λU
and νI(ti) =
2vji pi
λI
. Here, we have multiplied each max-
imization problem of by pi > 0, which does not change the
optimal solutions. In this setting, mixed-strategy equilibria
of the Lotto game are equivalent to that of n independent
two-player all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and
valuations.
We may then apply the algorithm of [20] to construct equi-
librium distributions F jU and {F jI (ti)}mi=1 for each battlefield
j. The constructed distributions are functions of the known
parameters as well as the Lagrange multipliers. If there exists
unique multipliers λ∗I , λ
∗
U > 0 such that the Lotto constraints
(LC) is met for all types {tiI}mi=1 for I and for type tU for U ,
then it is clear the n constructed strategy profiles constitute
a BNE for GL(XI , XU , V,p). Indeed, we have applied the
algorithm to obtain a set of distributions, and verified there is
a unique λ∗I , λ
∗
U > 0 such that (LC) is satisfied. The details
of this calculation are outlined as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. In GL(XI , XU , Vαβ , 1313), we deduce
from Lemma 1 that λiI = λI for all i = 1, 2, 3. Hence
we need only apply the algorithm of [20] to a single
“column” of the game to obtain all marginals of the BNE
since the valuations are identical in each battlefield, i.e. the
correspondences (19), (20) are the same for all battlefields
j, with a permutation of indices i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Denote the constructed marginal distributions as FU for
player U and {F dI , FαI , F βI } for player I , where “d” is for
the diagonal battlefield value 1. We find that depending on
whether λIλU ≥ 1, λIλU ∈ ( 12 , 1), or λIλU ∈ ( 12 , 13 ), the algorithm
determines three distinct sets of marginal distributions for
I and U . In each case, there are unique λI , λU > 0 such
that the constraint (LC) is met. For brevity, we illustrate the
calculation for one such case, as the other two follow similar
methods. If λIλU ≥ 1, the algorithm of [20] gives
FU (x) =
3λI
2c
x, x ∈
[
0,
2c
3λI
]
(21)
F dI (x) =
3λU
2c x+ 1− λUλI , x ∈
[
0, 2c3λI
]
FαI (x) = 1, x ≥ 0
F βI (x) = 1, x ≥ 0
(22)
The constraint (LC) requires that EF dI + EFαI + EFβI = XI
and 3EFU = XU , from which we obtain the unique solutions
λI =
1
XU (1+α+β)
and λU = 3γλI . This solution implies the
budget ratio satisfies γ ∈ (0, 13 ). Using these marginals, we
calculate the equilibrium ex-ante payoff (6) as
2
1+α+β
[∫ ∞
0
FUdF
d
I +α
∫ ∞
0
FUdF
α
I +β
∫ ∞
0
FUdF
β
I
]
−1.
(23)
From this, we obtain (9). The other cases λIλU ∈ ( 12 , 1) and
λI
λU
∈ ( 12 , 13 ) correspond to the budget ranges γ ∈ [ 13 , 23 ) and
γ ∈ [ 23 , 1), respectively.
For completeness, we present the marginals for the other
two cases. When γ ∈ [ 13 , 23 ), the unique solution of the
multipliers are λI = 1XU (1+α+β)
[
1−α
9γ2 + α
]
and λU =
3γλI . Denote the intervals I1 =
[
0, 2c
3
( α
λI
− α
λU
)
]
and I2 =[
2c
3
( α
λI
− α
λU
), 2c
3
( α
λI
+ 1−α
λU
)
]
. Then the equilibrium marginals
are
FU (x) =
{
3λI
2αcx x ∈ I1
3λI
2c x+(1− λIλU )(1−α) x ∈ I2
(24)
F dI (x) =
3λU
2c x− α
(
λU
λI
− 1
)
x ∈ I2
FαI (x) =
3λU
2αc x+ 2− λUλI x ∈ I1
F βI (x) = 1, x ≥ 0
(25)
When γ ∈ [ 23 , 1), the unique solution of the
multipliers are λI = cXU
[
β + 19γ2 (1 + 3α− 4β)
]
and
λU = 3γλI . Denote the intervals I1 =
[
0, 2c
3
( β
λI
− 2β
λU
)
]
,
I2 =
[
2c
3
(
β
λI
− 2β
λU
)
, 2c
3
(
β
λI
+α−2β
λU
)]
, and I3 =[
2c
3
(
β
λI
+α−2β
λU
)
, 2c
3
(
β
λI
+α−2β+1
λU
)]
. Then the equilibrium
marginals are calculated to be
FU (x) =

3λI
2βcx x ∈ I1
3λI
2αcx+
(
1−2 λIλU
)(
1−βα
)
x ∈ I2
3λI
2c x+ (1− β) + (2β − α− 1) λIλU x ∈ I3
(26)
F dI (x) =
3λU
2c x− β
(
λU
λI
− 2
)
− α x ∈ I3
FαI (x) =
3λU
2αc x− βα
(
λU
λI
− 2
)
x ∈ I2
F βI (x) =
3λU
2βc x+ 3− λUλI x ∈ I1
(27)

VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended the Colonel Blotto and General
Lotto games to a setting where players have asymmetric
information about the valuations of the battlefields. We
focused on the case when one player is completely informed
about the valuations but has fewer resources to allocate,
and the other player is uninformed. Our analysis on the
two battlefield case in the Colonel Blotto game shows
an informed player still cannot defeat its opponent in a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. We find a three battlefield
scenario presents enough complexity such that the informed
player in the General Lotto game can attain the advantage
for certain parameters.
A direction of future research involves generalizing the
connection of the all-pay auctions with asymmetric infor-
mation to the General Lotto game. This will allow us to
investigate General Lotto games where the players hold
arbitrary information structures.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Let d := XU −XI and q := b XUXU−XI c
so that XU = qd + r, where 0 ≤ r < d. Denote a delta
mass function centered at y ∈ R by δy . Define c := v¯/v.
We prove the Theorem by proposing a set of mixed strategy
distributions F ∗I = {F ∗I (t1), F ∗I (t2)}, and F ∗U each satisfying
(BC), and showing the strategy F ∗z is a best-response to F
∗
−z ,
z = I, U . For brevity, we prove the case when q is odd, as
the even case provides similar mixed strategies and follows
similar arguments. Let e ∈ (r, d), and consider the strategies
F ∗U =
1
sA
( q−1
2∑
k=1
c
q+1
2 −kδe+(k−1)d + δe+ q−12 d
+
q∑
k= q+12 +1
ck−
q+1
2 δe+(k−1)d
) (28)
F ∗I (t1) =
1
sB
(
vc
q−1
2
v¯ + v
δ q−1
2 d
+
q−1∑
k= q−12 +1
cq−1−kδkd
)
F ∗I (t2) =
1
sB
( q−1
2 −1∑
k=0
ckδkd +
vc
q−1
2
v¯ + v
δ q−1
2 d
) (29)
where
sA := 1 + 2
q−1
2∑
k=1
ck, sB :=
vc
q−1
2
v¯ + v
+
q−1
2 −1∑
k=0
ck (30)
are normalizing factors. Before proceeding, we make a
few remarks. These strategies are similar in nature to the
strategies provided in Gross & Wagner [8]. There, the authors
show that a strategy composed of equally spaced delta
functions with geometrically decreasing weights equalizes
the payoff of the other player, and vice versa. In a similar
fashion, the strategies (28) and (29) equalize the ex-ante
payoffs in certain intervals of the players’ allocation space.
Any allocation in these intervals give a best-response to the
other player’s equilibrium strategy.
Let xU ∈ [0, XU ] be an allocation to battlefield 1, leaving
XU−xU to battlefield 2. The payoff uU (xU , F ∗I (t1), ω1) (2)
of any allocation xU against F ∗I (t1) in battlefield set 1 is
1
sB
 q−1∑
k= q−1
2
+1
cq−1−k (v¯sgn(xU−kd)+vsgn((k+1)d−xU ))

+
1
sB
[
vc
q−1
2
v¯ + v
(¯
vsgn
(
xU− q−1
2
d
)
+vsgn
(
q+1
2
d−xU
))]
(31)
For notational purposes, let HU (v¯, v, xU ) denote the above
quantity. Then against F ∗I (t2), uU (xU , F
∗
I (t2), ω2) =
HU (v, v¯, xU ) in battlefield set 2. Given p = 12 , the
ex-ante utility is piU (xU , F ∗I ) =
1
2uU (xU , F
∗
I (t1), ω1) +
1
2uU (xU , F
∗
I (t2), ω2). After some algebra, we arrive at
piU (xU , F
∗
I ) =
{
v¯
sB
if xU ∈ (0, qd ]
0 if xU ∈ (qd,XU ]
(32)
Any mixed strategy FU with support on the interval (0, qd)
is a best-response to F ∗I , and hence F
∗
U ∈ BRU (F ∗I ). Now,
any pure allocation x1I ∈ [0, XI ] of player I against F ∗U in
type t1 gives the ex-interim utility piI(x1I , F
∗
U |t1) (4), as
−1
sA
 q−12∑
k=1
c
q+1
2
−k(¯vsgn(e+(k−1)d−x1I)−vsgn(e+(k−2)d−x1I))
+
(¯
vsgn
(
e+
q − 1
2
d−x1I
)
− vsgn
(
e+
(
q−1
2
−1
)
d−x1I
))
+
q∑
k= q+1
2
+1
ck−
q+1
2
(
v¯sgn(e+(k−1)d−x1I)−vsgn(e+(k−2)d−x1I)
)
(33)
For notational purposes, let HI(v¯, v, x1I) denote the above
quantity. One can list all possible values this takes as a
function of x1I (not shown due to space constraint). This
is increasing in x1I , and attains the maximum value when
x1I ∈ (e +
(
q−1
2
− 1) d,XI), giving maxx1I piI(x1I , F ∗U |t1) =− vsA (1 + c).
Any pure allocation x2I ∈ [0, XI ] of player I against
F ∗U in type t2 gives ex-interim utility piI(x
2
I , F
∗
U |t2) =
HI(v, v¯, x
2
I). Through a similar analysis, we find the max-
imal value − vsA (1 + c) is attained for x2I ∈ (0, e + q−12 d).
Hence, any mixed strategy FI(t1) with support on (e +(
q−1
2
− 1) d,XI) and FI(t2) with support on (0, e+ q−12 d) is
a best-response to F ∗U . Consequently, F
∗
I ∈ BRI(F ∗U ). The
quantities vsB and
v
sA
(1 + c) coincide, giving the value of
the game.

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